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LIVING WILL LEGISLATION IN COLORADO: AN
ANALYSIS OF THE COLORADO MEDICAL
TREATMENT DECISION ACT IN RELATION TO




Recent advances in medical technology have made it possible to
keep people "alive" even when all consciousness has been lost and there
is virtually no hope of recovery.I Similarly, technology is prolonging the
lives of people who are terminally ill, in great pain, but still conscious.
Medical technology is available which causes tremendous pain, offers no
real hope of a normal life, and merely prolongs the process of dying for
a matter of days, or even months. 2 More people are choosing to forego
such needless pain and opting not to be kept "alive" if they reach a
"persistent vegetative state."3 Natural death, or "death with dignity,"
has become an important concept. For these reasons the concept of a
"living will" has become very popular.
4
The term "living will" is a misnomer. The documents described by
that term are not wills. Nor do they have to do with living, but with
death. Nevertheless, because of the general popularity of the term, it
will be used in this article. Basically, a living will is a document executed
by a competent person in which he or she declares that under certain
specified medical circumstances, the declarant is not to be kept alive by
"extraordinary" or "heroic" means. 5 The contents and effectiveness of
a living will vary from state to state depending on the particular legisla-
* Professor of Law, University of Denver. B.A. Smith College (1963);J.D. Univer-
sity of Michigan (1966).
1. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE AND
BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, DECIDING TO FOREGO LIFE-SUSTAINING TREAT-
MENT 1 (1983) [hereinafter PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION].
2. See Satz v. Perlmutter, 362 So. 2d 160 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978), afftd, 379 So. 2d
359 (Fla. 1980).
3. CONCERN FOR DYING, A LEGAL GUIDE TO THE LIVING WILL, 1 (1983).
4. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, supra note 1, at 139-40. A letter dated July 24, 1984
from Abigail Van Buren to Charles R. Adams, III stated: "Every time the Living Will is
mentioned in my column the response from readers is overwhelming. My mail triples
from 10,000 letters a week to 30,000! In fact, this is by far the most popular issue in my
column to date and keeps gathering momentum." Adams & Adams, An Overview of Geor-
gia's Living Will Lgislalion, 36 MERCER L. REV. 45, 46 n.5 (1984).
5. The sample "living will" distributed by Concern For Dying, 250 West 57th Street,
New York, N.Y., 10107, to thousands of people across the country is as follows:
To My Family, My Physician, My Lawyer and All Others Whom It May Concern
Death is as much a reality as birth, growth, maturity and old age - it is the
one certainty of life. If the time comes when I can no longer take part in decisions
DENVER UNIVERSITY L4 W REVIEW
tion or common law of each jurisdiction. The Colorado Medical Treat-
ment Decision Act,6 which became effective on May 9, 1985, is designed
to recognize the efficacy of a particular form of living will in some very
limited circumstances which are specified in the Act.
This article will first set forth the facts of three illustrative cases in
which use of a living will might have been appropriate. Next, it will dis-
cuss the provisions of the Colorado Medical Treatment Decision Act as
they pertain to living wills and as they compare to provisions of similar
legislation in other jurisdictions. This article will then suggest how
other, existing legislation in Colorado may be used to help insure that a
person retains his right to determine when extraordinary medical treat-
ment shall cease. 7 Finally, proposals will be made for ways in which fu-
ture legislation might be drafted to accomplish more fully the widely-
recognized need which laymen are presently trying to meet by execution
for my own future, let this statement stand as an expression of my wishes and
directions, while I am still of sound mind.
If at such a time the situation should arise in which there is no reasonable
expectation of my recovery from extreme physical or mental disability, I direct
that I be allowed to die and not be kept alive by medications, artificial means or
"heroic measures". I do, however, ask that medication be mercifully adminis-
tered to me to alleviate suffering even though this may shorten my remaining life.
This statement is made after careful consideration and is in accordance with
my strong convictions and beliefs. I want the wishes and directions here ex-
pressed carried out to the extent permitted by law. Insofar as they are not legally
enforceable, I hope that those to whom this Will is addressed will regard them-
selves as morally bound by these provisions.
(Optional specific provisions to be made in this space - see other side)
DURABLE POWER OF ATTORNEY (optional)
I hereby designate to serve as my attorney-in-
fact or the purpose of making medical treatment decisions. This power of attor-
ney shall remain effective in the event that I become incompetent or otherwise
unable to make such decisions for myself.
Optional Notarization: Signed
"Sworn and subscribed to Date




copies of this request have been given to
(Optional) My Living Will is registered with Concern for Dying (No. ).
There is a real problem on the meaning of "extraordinary" or "heroic." A respirator
is by no means unusual treatment today. Certainly treating pneumonia with antibiotics is
not "extraordinary" in most situations. Yet the PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, at 191-92, in
discussing care appropriate for a patient in a persistent vegetative state, with no hope of
recovery, states:
Most of these patients periodically aspirate food or saliva into their lungs, which,
combined with inactivity, often leads to pneumonia. Some physicians treat all
such pneumonias with antibiotics; others leave them untreated; still others do
whatever the family prefers. Though the administration of antibiotics for suscep-
tible infections should not be so automatic a response by care givers and families
that it is beyond critical scrutiny in each case, either treating or not treating pneu-
monia in permanently unconscious patients remains morally acceptable, since at
this time the additional expense of lengthened survival does not seem
prohibitive.
6. COLO. REv. STAT. §§ 15-18-101 to -113 (Supp. 1985) [hereinafter Act].
7. See infra notes 150-63 and accompanying text.
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of a variety of living wills. 8
II. THREE ILLUSTRATIVE CASES
Three cases serve to illustrate the problems that arise in the absence
of a living will. First, is the well-known case of Karen Ann Quinlan.9 At
the outset, it should be recognized that current medical evidence is clear
that there is virtually no chance for return to independent intellectual
function after a person has been unconscious for a continuous period of
one month.' 0 On April 15, 1975, Karen Ann Quinlan was brought, un-
conscious, in a coma, to the hospital. She was attached to a respirator,
which was required for her breathing. I Although two-thirds of patients
who are supported by a respirator for at least six hours while in a coma
are dead within a month, about six percent remain indefinitely in a "per-
sistent vegetative state." 12 Karen Ann Quinlan was one of those in-
cluded within the six percent. On September 12, 1975,13 five months
after Karen Ann had become unconscious, Karen Ann's father sought
8. See infra notes 164-72 and accompanying text.
9. In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647, cert. denied sub noma. Garger v. NewJersey,
429 U.S. 922 (1976), modified, In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321,486 A.2d 1209 (1985) (a court can
admit into evidence prior statements made by the now-incapacitated person involved in
the decision).
10. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, supra note 1, at 459-60, containing Letter from Dr. Fred
Plum (Anne Parrish Titzell Professor Neurology, Cornell University Medical College; Neu-
rologist-in-Chief, The New York Hospital, New York, N.Y.) to Dr. Joanne Lynn regarding
reliability of prognosis for permanently unconscious patients (Dec. 22, 1981). The letter
stated:
1. Prognosis in permanently unconscious patients varies somewhat according to
the nature of the underlying disease. In patients with traumatic brain damage,
especially younger patients, a small number, perhaps 5%, can recover from such
states lasting as long as 4-6 weeks. If complete unconsciousness lasts for longer
than that period, I know of no evidence of a subject who has improved beyond
the level of severe disability, and very few of the latter exist.
2. In ischemic brain injury, good recovery after a period of complete uncon-
sciousness longer than two weeks is very rare, and longer than one month proba-
bly does not occur in more than a fraction of 1%. Even those few in whom late
evidence of cognitive awareness has reappeared had to be classified as having a
severe disability both from the standpoint of physical and intellectual residual. I
know of no example of such a patient who has returned to what can be considered
independent intellectual or motor function. Wakefulness, of course, in the sense
of having sleep and wake cycles, returns in almost all these subjects.
3. In conditions such as brain tumor, Alzheimer's disease, or other progressive
dementias, loss of consciousness for a period lasting as long as one month dic-
tates a hopeless prognosis. I suppose it is conceivable that such a patient could
be overmedicated for a period of that duration, but I know of no example either
by direct contact or anecdotal report of such a patient who has ever recovered any
measure of cognition when all consciousness had been lost for a continuous pe-
riod of 30 days or more.
In my experience, a major problem in this area lies with poor medical diag-
nosis. Many patients who are severely disoriented, agitated, or locked-in are
sometimes called unconscious by physicians. The statements above, of course,
can only apply when the diagnosis is secure.
11. In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d at 654.
12. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, supra note 1, at 172-73. "About 12%, typically those
whose coma was due to drug intoxication, made a good to moderate recovery, and about
an equal number were left with severe disability, though they regained consciousness." Id.
at 173 n.5.
13. J. QUINLAN, J. QUINLAN & P. BATTELLE, KAREN ANN, THE QUINLANS TELL THEIR
STORY, 142 (1977) [hereinafter KAREN ANN].
1987]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW
court appointment as her guardian for the purpose of having her re-
moved from the respirator. Eventually, on March 31, 1976, the New
Jersey Supreme Court granted his request.'
4
Authorization from the court, however, had no impact on Karen
Ann's doctor. As stated by the Quinlans:
When, some six weeks after the New Jersey Supreme Court
opinion authorizing the discontinuance of the respirator for
Karen Quinlan, the family asked her attending physician, Dr.
RobertJ. Morse, why the respirator care was still being contin-
ued, Dr. Morse explained, "I have tried to explain to you, I am
following medical protocol." When asked how long he would
keep her on the respirator if she could not successfully be
weaned, Dr. Morse replied, "For as long as it takes.
Forever." 
1 5
In May, 1976, Karen Ann was successfully weaned from the respira-
tor. 16 She continued to live until June 11, 1985,17 remaining in a "per-
sistent vegetative state," with virtually no chance for regaining
independent intellectual function.
The second illustrative case is that of Abe Perlmutter, a 73-year-old
victim of amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (Lou Gehrig's disease), who in
1978 won the legal right to be removed from life support apparatus and
allowed to die a natural death.' 8 Mr. Perlmutter's condition had be-
come hopeless, but he remained conscious and was destined to continue
to suffer great pain until his eventual death. He was incapable of move-
ment, unable to breathe without a respirator, and unable to speak with-
out extreme effort. Mr. Perlmutter repeatedly asked to be removed
from the life support apparatus and allowed to die. His family and phy-
sician concurred with his decision, but the request was not granted be-
cause of the fear of hospital personnel that possible criminal and civil
liability might result.19
Mr. Perlmutter then filed suit requesting that he be allowed to re-
fuse further medical treatment. Eventually, the trial court and the Flor-
ida District Court of Appeals2 0 ruled in favor of Mr. Perlmutter. The
District Court of Appeals declared that "because Abe Perlmutter has a
right to refuse treatment in the first instance, he has a concomitant right
to discontinue it."''z  The court concluded that:
when .. .public policy interests are weighed against the rights
of Mr. Perlmutter, the latter must and should prevail. Abe Perl-
14. In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647, cert. denied sub nom. Garger v. New Jersey,
429 U.S. 922 (1976).
15. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, supra note 1, at 183 n.31 (citation omitted).
16. Id. at 171 n.1.
17. Vitiello, Death with Dignity in Mississippi? An Analysis of Mississippi's Natural Death Act,
54 Miss. L.J. 459, 490 n.213 (1984).
18. Satz v. Perlmutter, 362 So. 2d 160 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978), aff'd, 379 So. 2d 359
(Fla. 1980).
19. Id. at 162.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 163.
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mutter should be allowed to make his choice to die with dig-
nity, notwithstanding over a dozen legislative failures in this
state to adopt suitable legislation in this field. It is all very con-
venient to insist on continuing Mr. Perlmutter's life so that
there can be no question of foul play, no resulting civil liability
and no possible trespass on medical eithics. However, it is
quite another matter to do so at the patient's sole expense and
against his competent will, thus inflicting never ending physical
torture on his body until the inevitable, but artificially sus-
pended, moment of death. Such a course of conduct invades
the patient's constitutional right of privacy, removes his free-
dom of choice and invades his right [of self-determination]. 22
This decision was affirmed by the Florida Supreme Court in 1980, after
Mr. Perlmutter had been removed from the respirator and had died.2 3
The final illustrative case is that ofJohn and Clyde Forrest. On July
3, 1986, John Forrest was convicted of first degree murder and sen-
tenced to life in prison for the death of his father, Clyde. Clyde had
been terminally ill, with severe respiratory and cardiopulmonary
problems. On Christmas Eve of 1985 John shot his father to death,
claiming to have done so solely to end Clyde's prolonged, hopeless suf-
fering. For purposes of this article, we will assume that John's motives
were exactly as he stated. Commenting on the case, the North Carolina
prosecuting attorney said, "killing someone to put them out of their
misery is not a legal, justified excuse to kill someone under North Caro-
lina law."1
2 4
John's solution for Clyde's problem was inappropriate and illegal.
But the problem of Clyde Forrest's continued suffering and pain, with
no hope of recovery, is a problem that confronts many families. It is a
problem that must be confronted by the legal system, and one that must
be solved in a way appropriate for the majority of families who lack the
sophistication and wealth 25 to undertake the prolonged litigation re-
quired in the Quinlan and Perlmutter cases.
III. COLORADO MEDICAL TREATMENT DECISION ACT COMPARED TO
ACTS IN OTHER JURISDICTIONS
In Colorado, the legislature has begun to address the problem of
22. Id. at 164.
23. Satz v. Perlmutter, 379 So. 2d 359 (Fla. 1980).
24. Son Who Killed Father To End His Pain Gets Life, Denver Post, July 4, 1986, at 6A,
col. 1.
25. Although most prolonged litigation requires substantial sums of money, the Quin-
lan case did not. When Joseph Quinlan, on August 6, 1975, first visited the Legal Aid
Office in Dover, NewJersey, seeking assistance for his 2 1-year-old daughter who was "un-
employed," he met a remarkable young Attorney, Paul Armstrong, who had recently re-
ceived his J.D. from Notre Dame. Ultimately, Paul Armstrong decided to resign from his
job at Legal Aid to represent the Quinlans. While struggling through law school Paul had
promised himself "that if he could ever do something to help someone out - or help
society" he would never let money interfere. KAREN ANN, supra note 13, at 123-35. When
Paul met with Joe Quinlan to say that he would agree to take the case he said, "Joe, if you
and Julie wish to repose your trust in me, I would be honored to represent you - but
there will be no fee." Id.
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artificially prolonging the dying process by enactment of the Colorado
Medical Treatment Decision Act.26 At the outset, it is important to note
that in Colorado the use of the particular statutory form is not
mandatory. The Act specifically provides that such a declaration "may,
but need not be" in the form suggested in the statute.2 7 Thus, unlike
California 2 8 and Georgia, 29 for example, Colorado does not require that
the particular statutory form be used. In Colorado, the statutory form is
merely a sample of one acceptable form of living will.
There are good and bad aspects to the flexibility permitted under
Colorado law. The declarant, within limits, 30 may tailor the form to
meet his or her specific needs and desires. For example, if a person
wanted to increase the time period of continued incompetence from
forty-eight hours to six weeks, he or she could presumably do so.
3 1 Sim-
ilarly, if a person wanted to specify a particular list of doctors who
should be consulted in the face of terminal illness and incapacity, that
should be acceptable. 32 In addition, a person might want to spell out in
more detail just which life-sustaining procedures he or she would con-
sider acceptable or unacceptable. 3 3 Colorado permits a fair degree of
individual modification of the suggested form to meet the goals of the
particular declarant. One added benefit of this flexibility may be that a
declarant who is allowed to modify the suggested form to meet his or
her own needs may give the entire matter more careful consideration
than would be the case if he or she merely filled in the blanks in a stan-
dard form. Such heightened consideration is certainly desirable.
In California3 4 and Georgia, 3 5 by contrast, the authorized statutory
living will forms are mandatory - the exact statutory form must be used
or the statutory recognition of the document is unavailable. Individual
modifications will cause the form to be ineffective. The California Natu-
26. COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 15-18-101 to -113 (Supp. 1985).
27. Id. at § 15-18-104(3).
28. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7188 (West Supp. 1986); see the detailed require-
ments for a printed form of a durable power of attorney for health care authorized for
distribution in California after January 1, 1986. CAL. CIVIL CODE §§ 2444, 2432-33 (West
Supp. 1986). The California Natural Death Act was the first such Act adopted in the
United States.
29. GA. CODE ANN. § 31-32-3(b) (Supp. 1986).
30. See COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 15-18-103, -104, -107, -112 (Supp. 1985).
31. COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-18-107 (Supp. 1985) provides that " [i]f no action to chal-
lenge the validity of a declaration has been filed within forty-eight consecutive hours after
the certification is made by the physicians, the attending physician shall then withdraw or
withhold all life-sustaining procedures pursuant to the terms of the declaration." It seems
clear that the legislature did not intend to allow that life-sustaining procedures be with-
drawn in less than 48 hours.
32. COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-18-104(3) (Supp. 1985).
33. There are arguments for and against specificity. Specificity assists doctors and
family in clarifying exactly which treatments, under what circumstances, would be refused
by the declarant. Because the meaning of terms such as "extraordinary" or "heroic" may
vary from case to case, or from time to time, or from one doctor to another, more specific
details of the declarant's wishes would be helpful. Yet too much specificity may be harm-
ful, by tending to make the declarant's choices very rigid and not responsive to later
changes in medical technology, medical techniques, etc.
34. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7188 (West Supp. 1986).
35. GA. CODE ANN. § 31-32-3(b) (Supp. 1986).
[Vol. 64:1
LIVING WILL LEGISLATION IN COLORADO
ral Death Act, for example, provides that the declaration "shall be in the
following form."' 36 There are two major benefits from the rigidity re-
quired by the California and Georgia statutes. First, a declaration in the
required statutory form will undoubtedly comply with the terms of the
statute and will be effective if properly executed. There is no danger of
individual modification causing the declaration, or living will, to request
something not permitted by statute, thereby threatening the validity of
the declaration. If people are content merely to fill in the blanks in a
standard form,3 7 the living will should be effective - whether or not it is
exactly consistent with the declarant's own wishes in the matter.
The second benefit to the California and Georgia rigidity, which is
also an argument against Colorado's flexibility, is that doctors will read-
ily be able to determine the validity of a declaration executed in stan-
dard form. Once the patient is allowed to vary the terms of the form,
the doctor is put in the unfortunate position of being required to inter-
pret state law. A physician, presumably trained only as an expert in
medicine, should not be required to render a legal opinion as to whether
or not a particular individualized form complies with the applicable stat-
ute. To impose such an obligation on physicians might have the unin-
tended, unforeseen consequence of causing physicians to refuse to
comply with individualized declarations until the validity of each one
had been tested in court. A legal climate which in practice leads to liti-
gation of a high percentage of living wills is unacceptable - for both
emotional and financial reasons.
Perhaps the best statute might be one which specifically lists the
provisions which might be changed by the individual - resulting in a
document similar to the real estate forms now used in Colorado.3 8 Such
forms would be easily recognizable by doctors, clearly valid under the
statute, and yet adaptable to the choices of the individual.
A. Requirements for Execution
Under the Colorado Act the declaration must be executed by a com-
petent adult - a person eighteen years of age or older 39 - and must be
executed before two witnesses, who must both be present at the time of
the execution.40 The Act precludes certain individuals from acting as a
36. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7188 (West Supp. 1986) (emphasis added).
37. Based on the number of cases litigated in which people have incorrectly filled in a
regular will form, one cannot help but wonder if a statutorily required living will form will
be entirely effective. Nevertheless, California seems to favor mandatory forms. See, e.g.,
CAL. PROB. CODE § 6241 (West Supp. 1986) which permits a testator to establish a fairly
complex testamentary trust, if he fills in the blanks exactly as directed.
38. See the standard forms promulgated by the Colorado Real Estate Commission,
found in the 1986 COLORADO REAL ESTATE MANUAL, ch. 26. The legislature should provide
a list of the specific areas in which the statutory form might be changed to suit the interests
of each particular declarant. Changes would not be allowed in other areas. This concept
was suggested by Frank McAleer, Denver University Law Review.
39. COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-18-103(1), (4) (Supp. 1985).
40. Id. at § 15-18-106(1).
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witness. Those individuals are the attending physician, 4 1 employees of
the physician or the health care facility, 42 fellow patients, 43 persons hav-
ing a claim against the estate of the declarant, 44 and persons believing
that they will be entitled to a portion of the estate upon death.
45
The statute is unclear whether it excludes as an acceptable witness a
spouse who would take nothing under the will then in existence, would
take nothing as an heir at law because all property will pass under the
will, but has a right to an elective share. 4 6 Perhaps such a spouse would
be excluded as "a person who has a claim against the estate at the time
the declaration is executed."'4 7 This point should be clarified. Because
the suggested form in the Act has a standard attestation clause and a
standard clause for notarization, both should be included, although
Judge Field Benton, of the Denver Probate Court, has stated that since
the form is "a permissive exemplar ... [the] attestation clause and nota-
rial verification . . . seemingly are not obligatory elements of de-
clarations."
4 8
As with a regular will, if the declarant is physically unable to sign the
declaration, it may be signed by some other person for him, in his pres-
ence and at his direction. 4 9 The person who signs the living will for a
physicially incapacitated declarant is subject to the same exclusionary
provisions applicable to witnesses for the living will. 50 There is no spe-
cific statutory provision that the one who signs a living will for a declar-
ant cannot also be a witness. Certainly, however, the use of three
qualified persons in such a situation should be standard practice.
The requirements for witnessing a living will are much stricter in
Colorado than are the requirements for witnessing a regular will. When
a person executes a regular will in Colorado, disposing of all his worldly
goods, the witnesses need not be present at the same time, need not see
the testator actually sign the will, need not be present when the testator
signs the will, 5 1 and may be major beneficiaries - or even a sole benefi-
ciary52 - under the will. In Colorado, the witnesses to a "regular will"
need not be the least bit disinterested. A regular will need not be nota-
rized, 53 which may or may not set it apart from a living will.
41. Id. at §§ 15-18-105(1)(a), 106(1).
42. Id. at §§ 15-18-105(1)(b), 106(1).
43. Id. at § 15-18-106(2).
44. Id. at §§ 15-18-105(1)(c), 106(1).
45. Id. at §§ 15-18-105(l)(d), 106(1).
46. Id. at §§ 15-11-201, 202.
47. Id. at § 15-18-105(1)(c).
48. Benton, The New Colorado Medical Treatment Decision Act, 14 COLO. LAw. 1190, 1196
(1985) (emphasis added).
49. COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-18-105(1) (Supp. 1985).
50. Id.
51. Id. at § 15-11-502.
52. Id. at § 15-11-505(2).
53. CoLO. REV. STAT. § 15-11-502 (1973) provides for the signature of two witnesses,
which is mandatory for all wills except holographic wills. COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-11-504
(Supp. 1985), allowing the self-proving affidavit executed before a notary, clearly makes
use of that technique optional.
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It is, of course, most appropriate to have stricter requirements for a
living will than for a regular will. Certainly a person's life is far more
important to him than his property, and strict requirements for execu-
tion of a living will may serve both to ensure the validity of the docu-
ment and to impress upon the declarant the importance of the
declaration being signed. Many states, however, provide for the same
formality of execution for both documents.
54
B. When Does a Living Will Become Applicable?
A living will may be enacted with authorization to become applica-
ble only when the declarant "is in a terminal condition and either un-
conscious or otherwise incompetent to decide whether any medical
procedure or intervention should be accepted or rejected."' 5 5 "Termi-
nal condition" is defined as "an incurable or irreversible condition for
which the administration of life-sustaining procedures will serve only to
postpone the moment of death." 56 This definition of a terminal condi-
tion would have applied in the above-referenced case of Abe Perlmut-
ter,5 7 and if he had previously executed a living will, it would have
become applicable after Abe Perlmutter had lost consciousness. Would
it, however, have covered the case of Abe Perlmutter after he had lost
the ability to communicate, but had still not become unconscious or in-
competent? Probably not. The Act requires that the declarant be both in
a terminal condition and unconscious, 5 8 assuming he or she had previ-
ously executed a living will.
Would the statutory requirement that the declarant be in a terminal
condition be met by a person in the situation of Karen Ann Quinlan if
she had executed a declaration while she was competent? Probably not.
The longest survival on record for a person in a "persistent vegetative
state" like Karen Ann Quinlan's is thirty-seven years. 5 9 Persons in that
state do not die from the vegetative state itself, but from other complica-
tions. 60 It might be rather difficult to argue that someone who might
"live" for an additional thirty-seven years was really in the terminal con-
54. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110'/2 703(3)(b) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1985) which pro-
vides that "[a] document described in subsection (a) of this Section is not valid unless it
has been executed with the same formalities as required of a valid will pursuant to the
Probate Act of 1975" (emphasis added).
55. COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-18-104(1) (Supp. 1985).
56. Id. at § 15-18-103(10).
57. See supra notes 18-23 and accompanying text.
58. COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-18-104(1) (Supp. 1985) provides "that life-sustaining pro-
cedures [may] be withheld or withdrawn if ... [the patient] is in a terminal condition and
either unconscious or otherwise incompetent to decide .... (emphasis added).
59. According to the PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, supra note I, at 177 n.16, "[tihe long-
est case of coma on record is that of Elaine Esposito, who never recovered consciousness
after receiving general anesthesia for surgery on August 6, 1941. She died 37 years and
111 days later . ... "
60. "[C]omplications of their debilitated state, such as infections . . . are more often
lethal when antibiotics are not provided." Id. at 186. The Judicial Council of the Ameri-
can Medical Association in 1982 said that "[w]here a terminally ill patient's coma is beyond
doubt irreversible and there are adequate safeguards to confirm the accuracy of the diag-
nosis, all means of life support may be discontinued." Id.
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dition required by the statute. If a life expectancy of up to thirty-seven
years can constitute a "terminal condition," then the term is essentially
meaningless.
Would the Colorado Act be of use in a situation exactly like that of
the Quinlan case - where the comatose person had not executed a dec-
laration and her relatives were seeking to terminate useless medical
treatment? Clearly not. The Colorado Act is applicable only to declara-
tions made by competent adults for themselves. 6 1 It does not provide
any guidance or protection for persons in the position of Karen Ann
Quinlan's father. Would the Colorado Act change the result in the case
ofJohn and Clyde Forrest, mentioned above?6 2 Definitely not. The Act
clearly states that "nothing in this article shall be construed ... as con-
doning, authorizing, or approving euthanasia or mercy killing, nor as
permitting any affirmative or deliberate act or omission to end life, ex-
cept to permit natural death as provided in this article."
'6 3
The California Natural Death Act64 would be even less helpful.
"Terminal condition" in the California Act is defined as "an incurable
condition caused by injury, disease, or illness which, regardless of the appli-
cation of life-sustaining procedures, would, within reasonable medical judg-
ment, produce death, and where the application of life-sustaining
procedures serve only to postpone the moment of death of the pa-
tient."' 65 Treatment of a person in such condition may be stopped only
"when death is imminent regardless of treatment." 66 In a survey made
of California doctors one year after adoption of the California Natural
Death Act, 67 forty-six percent of doctors considered death imminent
only if it would occur within twenty-four hours. 68 More than eighty per-
cent of the doctors surveyed considered death imminent only if it would
occur within one week. 69 If the California statute is interpreted by the
great majority of the California doctors to be applicable only in situa-
tions in which the patient is expected to die within one week - whether
or not treatment is provided - the statute may be of marginal utility.
Legislation which may serve to allow a person to shorten his dying pro-
cess by one week is not dramatically helpful.
61. COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-18-103(9) (Supp. 1985).
62. See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text.
63. COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-18-112(1).
64. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 7185-95 (West. Supp. 1986).
65. Id. at § 7187(0 (emphasis added).
66. Id. at § 7187(c).
67. Note, The California Natural Death Act: An Empirical Study of Physicians' Practices, 31
STAN. L. REV. 913, 925 & n.66 (1979). A questionnaire was mailed to 920 physicians, of
whom 284 responded.
68. Id. at 933.
69. Id. at 933 n.92. The cumulative percentage of doctors who would consider death
as imminent was as follows:
If within 24 hours or less 45.9%
one week or less 83.4%
two weeks or less 91.5%
one month or less 96.1%
six months or less 100.0%
Id.
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The California Natural Death Act would not have been useful in
either of the Perlmutter or Quinlan cases. Death simply was not "immi-
nent" for Abe Perlmutter or Karen Ann Quinlan. Nor would John For-
rest's act have been protected in California. California, 70 like Colorado
and many other states, 7 1 specifically prohibits mercy killings.
In fact, there is only a remote chance that anyone will be able to
benefit by the extensive provisions of the California Natural Death Act.
Under section 7188 of the California Act, the declaration can be exe-
cuted only after at least fourteen days have passed since the declarant
was notified that he or she had a terminal condition. 7 2 When the statu-
tory definition of terminal condition, "incurable condition . . . which,
regardless of the application of life-sustaining procedures, would . . .
produce death," '73 is combined with the statutory definition of life-sus-
taining procedures, "any medical procedure . . . which . . . would serve
only to artificially prolong the moment of death and where ... death is
imminent, ' ' 74 it appears that the only people who might benefit from the
California Natural Death Act are those who surprise their doctors by
continuing to live, and remain conscious and competent more than four-
teen days after death was determined to be imminent. Fortunately, Col-
orado and many other states have not included provisions allowing
execution of a living will only after the patient has been informed of a
terminal condition.
75
If a declarant is pregnant at the time the declaration otherwise
would become applicable, Colorado, like many other states, provides for
suspension of the applicability of the declaration. The Colorado Act
provides that:
In the case of a declaration of a qualified patient known to the
attending physician to be pregnant, a medical evaluation shall
be made as to whether the fetus is viable and could with a rea-
sonable degree of medical certainty develop into live birth with
continued application of life-sustaining procedures. If such is
the case, the declaration shall be given no force or effect.
76
70. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7195 (West Supp. 1986). "Nothing in this chapter
shall be construed to condone, authorize, or approve mercy killing, or to permit any af-
firmative or deliberate act or omission to end life other than to permit the natural process
of dying as provided in this chapter."
71. 63 Del. Laws. c. 386 Sec. 3; ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110/2, 709(f) (Smith-Hurd Supp.
1985); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 765.11 (West 1986); GA. CODE ANN. § 31-32-1 1(b) (1985); W.
VA. CODE § 16-30-10 (1985); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 154.11(6) (West Supp. 1986).
72. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7191(b) (West Supp. 1986), which provides
that the physician must determine that "the declarant was a qualified patient at least 14
days prior to executing or re-executing the directive."
73. Id. at § 7187(f).
74. Id. at § 7187(c).
75. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, §§ 2501-09 (1983); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. l101/2,
701-10 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1985); GA. CODE ANN. § 31-32-3 to -4 (1985 & Supp. 1986); see
also The Kansas Natural Death Act, KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 65-28-101 to -109 (1985), which
substantially enacted a proposal made by students in the Yale Law School Legislative Serv-
ices Program, and did not include any provision that the declaration could only be exe-
cuted after the declarant had been informed of a terminal condition. Vitiello, supra note
17, at 468.
76. COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-18-104(2) (Supp. 1985). Recently, in Georgia, a brain-
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C. How Long Is A Living Will Applicable?
Colorado has avoided an unfortunate renewal requirement con-
tained in other state statutes. California, 7 7 for example, requires that a
declaration, though properly executed, must be reexecuted every five
years to remain valid. In 1986, both Wisconsin 78 and Georgia 79 deleted
their reexecution requirements. California provides that a declaration
continues to remain valid, even after the five years, if the declarant has
become comatose or incapable of communicating with the physician
while the declaration is valid.8 0 Georgia allows a declaration prepared
with the old standard of seven years' duration to be extended indefi-
nitely by lining through and initialing the paragraph containing the
seven-year limit.8 ' Wisconsin permits a declaration to remain valid if
the declarant becomes incompetent.
8 2
Because of the ease with which a declaration can be revoked,8 3 the
requirement of periodic reexecution seems unnecessary and might de-
prive a person of the benefits of a living will just when the document is
most needed. In Colorado, a living will remains applicable until revoked
by the declarant.8 4 To deprive a person of the provisions of his or her
living will simply because he or she forgets to renew the will exactly on
time is unwise. A more reasonable approach is to follow the lead of
regular wills which, of course, do not require periodic reexecution.
D. What Directions May Be Included in a Living Will?
Under the Colorado Act, "[a]ny competent adult may execute a
declaration directing that life-sustaining procedures be withheld or with-
drawn if, at some future time, he is in a terminal condition and either
unconscious or otherwise incompetent to decide whether any medical
procedure or intervention should be accepted or rejected." 8 5 Under the
Colorado Act, however, a person is not permitted to direct that nourish-
ment or pain killers be withheld. 86 Because nourishment may not be
withheld in Colorado, a person in the condition of Karen Ann Quinlan
might continue to "live" for ten years - or thirty-seven years - after
she had been weaned from the respirator, even though the person had
previously executed the strongest declaration permitted under Colorado
dead pregnant woman was kept alive until the fetus could be delivered. The woman's
husband wanted the respirator turned off. The putative father of the child opposed that
act. The child was delivered, but died the next day. N.Y. Times, August 17, 1986, at 14
col. 6.
77. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7189.5 (West Supp. 1986).
78. WIs. STAT. ANN. § 154.03 (West Supp. 1986).
79. GA. CODE ANN. §§ 31-32-3(b), 31-32-6 (Supp. 1986).
80. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7189.5 (West Supp. 1986).
81. GA. CODE ANN. § 31-32-6(b) (Supp. 1986).
82. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 154.07(2) (Supp. 1986).
83. See infra notes 108-11 and accompanying text.
84. COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-18-109 (Supp. 1985).
85. Id. at § 15-18-104(1).
86. Id. at § 15-18-103(7).
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law. 8
7
Florida, 88 Georgia,8 9 Illinois, 90 and Wisconsin 9 ' follow the same
pattern as Colorado and specifically provide that no declaration can au-
thorize the withholding of nourishment. Under the Natural Death Acts
of California9 2 and West Virginia,9 3 however, nourishment evidently
may be withheld, in an appropriate case, if so directed by the declarant.
Both acts provide that the term "life-sustaining procedure" does not in-
clude "the administration of medication or the performance of any med-
ical procedure deemed necessary to alleviate pain." ' 94
The unpleasant option of allowing a person to direct that nourish-
ment be withheld if he or she is terminally ill and unconscious must be
weighed against the equally unpleasant alternative of, in effect, requir-
ing a person to "live" in a permanently vegetative state for ten - or
thirty-seven - years. States have simply reached different conclusions
on this very difficult point. Perhaps the question of nourishment is an
area which might better be left to the discretion of the person involved.
In those states in which use of the statutory form is not mandatory,
should not a competent adult who is executing his or her own living will
be permitted to specify what should be done about medical treatment,
including nourishment, if the person is someday in a persistent vegeta-
tive state similar to that in which Karen Ann Quinlan lived for so many
years? When a person is unconscious and has no chance of regaining
cognitive functions, it is difficult to believe that the state has an overrid-
ing interest in keeping the person "alive" - despite the tremendous
emotional and financial burden which may thereby be imposed on the
person's family. Whether the intravenous or nasal tubes contain nour-




88. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 765.03(3) (West 1986).
89. GA. CODE ANN. § 31-32-2(5)(A) (1985).
90. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 1101/2, 702(c) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1986).
91. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 154.01(5)(b) (Supp. 1986).
92. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7187(c) (West Supp. 1986).
93. W. VA. CODE § 16-30-2(6) (1985).
94. Id.; CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7 187(c) (West Supp. 1986).
95. According to the PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION:
Most patients with permanent unconsciousness cannot be sustained for long
without an array of increasingly artificial feeding interventions - nasogastric
tubes, gastrostomy tubes, or intravenous nutrition. Since permanently uncon-
scious patients will never be aware of nutrition, the only benefit to the patient of
providing such increasingly burdensome interventions is sustaining the body to
allow for a remote possibility of recovery. ...
PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, supra note 1, at 190 (footnote omitted).
The awkward posture and lack of motion of unconscious patients often lead
to pressure sores, and skin lesions are a major complication .... After a pro-
longed period of paralysis, joints become fixed, and limbs and fingers become
irreversibly flexed. If vigorous intervention is maintained for a few months, the
patient's body can become fairly rigid in a position that is most accommodating to
hygiene and skin care, which is an acceptable goal of simplifying nursing care. ...
Id. at 191.
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E. What Is The Revocation Procedure for a Living Will?
The Colorado revocation procedure is fairly typical. 9 6 A declara-
tion "may be revoked by the declarant orally, in writing, or by burning,
tearing, cancelling, obliterating, or destroying said declaration. ' '9 7 The
Georgia statute includes an interesting provision allowing revocation
"by any verbal or nonverbal expression" 98 by a declarant "without re-
gard to his mental state or competency." 9 9 Under the Georgia provi-
sion, a reflex motion by a comatose person may be interpreted to revoke
permanently a declaration which the person had executed and re-exe-
cuted several times during the previous thirty-five years of competent
decision-making. All states, however, rightfully attempt to make revoca-
tion of living wills as easy as possible because of the irreversible conse-
quences of implementation of the terms of a living will.
There are significant differences in the statutory patterns. Nevada
evidently requires that the revocation be made only by a declarant who
is mentally competent.10 0 Delaware requires that an oral revocation be
made before two witnesses at or over the age of eighteen.' 0 ' Illinois
0 2
and West Virginia 10 3 require that an oral revocation be made before a
witness at or over the age of eighteen who signs and dates a written
confirmation of the revocation. West Virginia specifically provides that
the declarant need not be mentally competent when he or she makes the
oral revocation.' 0 4 Illinois, like Colorado, is silent on whether or not
mental competence is required for an effective revocation.
10 5
Multiple copies of the declaration can be executed so that everyone
who may be involved in the decision to withhold or withdraw life-sus-
taining procedures may have a copy of the declaration. 106 But in light of
the common provisions that a declaration may be revoked by "burning,
tearing, or obliterating," it would seem dangerous to have more than
one original copy of a declaration in existence. Too many "regular" will
cases have been litigated on the issue of whether or not revocation of
one duplicate original effectively revokes the entire will. 107 Such litiga-
tion should be legislatively precluded from living wills. Perhaps Wiscon-
sin has reached the best solution to the problem of duplicate originals
96. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7189 (West Supp. 1986); ILL. ANN. STAT.
ch. 1 10'/2, 705 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1986).
97. COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-18-109 (Supp. 1985).
98. GA. CODE ANN. § 31-32-5(a)(3) (1985).
99. Id. at § 31-32-5(a).
100. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 449.620(1) (Michie 1986).
101. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16 § 2504(a)(2) (1983) applies without regard to declarant's
mental capacity.
102. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 1101/2, 705(a)(3) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1986).
103. W. VA. CODE § 16-30-4(a)(3) (1985).
104. Id. at § 16-30-4(a).
105. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 1101A, 705 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1986).
106. Comment, The Right to Die a Natural Death and the Living Will, 13 TEX. TECH. L. REV.
99, 127 (1982).
107. See, e.g., In re Estate of Tong, 619 P.2d 91 (Colo. App. 1980) (entire will revoked);
In re Estate of Shane, 572 P.2d 229 (Okla. 1977) (missing duplicate created presumption
of revocation).
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by providing that "[o]nly the original declaration is a valid
instrument." 108
Even without the problem of duplicate originals, problems may
arise whenever an instrument may be revoked by "burning, tearing, or
destroying" the instrument. Because physical destruction of the will
need not take place in front of witnesses, there will be possible questions
as to who actually tore the document - the declarant, or perhaps a child
of the declarant who did not agree with the document's provisions. Sim-
ilarly, where mental capacity is a requirement for revocation, when the
declaration is simply found, torn in half, beside the bed of a declarant
who has recently lost mental competence, there will be an issue as to
whether destruction of the will took place before or after the declarant
lost mental consciousness. Problems will also arise for those people
whose mental competence may come and go at different times during
the day. Nevertheless, despite the many problems which may arise when
statutes permit a declaration to be revoked by an unwitnessed act, it is
best to be very liberal in accepting as valid any act which might have been
intended by the declarant to be a valid revocation.
Nearly all states provide that either a revocation is not effective until
the physician knows about it, 1° 9 or that a physician is not criminally or
civilly liable for acting in compliance with a declaration in the absence of
actual notice of revocation. 110 Colorado follows the latter pattern, by
stating that "[a]ny physician may act in compliance with such a declara-
tion in the absence of actual notice of revocation .. 1.. "I II
F. What Protection Does a Statutorily Authorized Living Will Provide for
Health Care Professionals Who Act in Compliance With its
Directions?
In both the Quinlan and Perlmutter situations, the reason the medi-
cal personnel refused to comply with the wishes of the families or pa-
tients without a court order was that they were afraid of being sued,
108. WIs. STAT. ANN. § 154.01(2) (Supp. 1986) (emphasis added). Mississippi may also
have "solved" the problem by a very controversial provision requiring that a declaration
befiled with the bureau of vital statistics. MIss. CODE ANN. § 41-41-107(2) (Supp. 1985).
According to one commentator:
The first problem is that few people will be aware of that requirement. Many
people secure living wills from national organizations, and execute them without
knowledge of local law. Undoubtedly, many Mississippians have done so. How-
ever, Mississippi's filing requirement is unique. Even within the state, it would
appear that the filing requirement has not been widely publicized. Thus, it is
probable that mnany more people execute noncomplying than complying
documents.
Vitiello, supra note 17, at 486-87 (footnotes omitted). Mr. Vitiello found that immediately
after a bar presentation on the Mississippi Act, only three out of twenty-two lawyers who
had attended the presentation realized that there was a filing requirement. Id. at n. 193.
109. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 765.06 (West 1986); GA. CODE ANN. § 31-32-5(a)(2), (3) (1985);
W. VA. CODE § 16-30-4(a)(2), (3) (1985); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 154.05(l)(c) (Supp. 1986).
110. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7189(b) (West Supp. 1986); DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
16, § 2504(b) (1983); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 1101/2, 705(b) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1986).
111. CoLo. REV. STAT. § 15-18-1 10(l)(a) (Supp. 1985).
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either civilly or criminally, for the deaths of the patients.' 12 While such
suits, in fact, are very rare,' 13 the fear is nevertheless understandable.
Not one of the statutes studied provides full protection for a doctor
who orders termination of life-sustaining procedures for a qualified pa-
tient. Under each statute, the doctor must either act in compliance with
the statute,1 4 act in good faith and pursuant to reasonable stan-
dards,' 15 or act in compliance with a declaration which appears on its
face to have been properly executed in compliance with the statute.116
As indicated above,"1 7 when a doctor is asked to determine whether or
not a declaration, appearing on its face to have been properly executed,
is in compliance with the statute, he or she is being asked to make a legal
conclusion for which he or she has not been trained.
If the doctor is protected only if he or she acts "in good faith and
pursuant to reasonable medical standards," 118 he or she has virtually no
protection from suit. The basis for nearly every medical malpractice suit
is simply that the doctor failed to act in accordance with reasonable
medical standards. 1 9 What those standards are varies from place to
place and from time to time. Only litigation finally determines whether
or not a particular doctor's actions complied with reasonable medical
standards. So statutes with provisions like Illinois ' 20 and West Vir-
ginia's,121 requiring compliance with reasonable medical standards, of-
fer no real protection for a doctor who obeys the provisions of a living
will.
If the doctor does not withhold or withdraw life-sustaining proce-
dures as directed, he or she may also be sued. On September 18, 1985,
the New York Times reported on what was believed to be the first such
trial in the nation.122 The Ohio Court of Appeals for the Ninth District
had ordered reinstatement of a $1.26 million damage suit against a doc-
112. In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647, 651 (1976); Satz v. Perlmutter, 362 So.
2d 160, 162 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
113. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, supra note 1, at 154. In fact, judicial review or action of
any type is rare.
114. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7190 (West Supp. 1986); GA. CODE ANN. § 31-32-7
(1985); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 154.07(1) (Supp. 1986).
115. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 1 10/2, 707 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1986); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 765.10(1), (2) (West 1984); W. VA. CODE § 16-30-7(a)(1985).
116. CoLo. REV. STAT. § 15-18-110(1) (Supp. 1985).
117. See supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text.
118. See W. VA. CODE § 16-30-7(a) (1985); see also supra note 115.
119. The statutes listed in note 115, supra, may provide adequate protection against
criminal prosecution - certainly in all but the most extraordinary cases.
120. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 1101/2, 707 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1986).
121. W. VA. CODE § 16-30-7(a) (1985).
122. Doctor on Trial in "Right to Die" Case, N.Y. Times, Sept. 18, 1985, at A17, col. 1.
Additionally, when relatives are asked to consent to medical procedures, there may be
interesting problems as to which relative should prevail in the event of a conflict. For
example, in Clarke, The Choice to Refuse or Withhold Medical Treatment: The Emerging Technol-
ogy and Medical-Ethical Consensus, 13 CREIGHTON L. REV. 795, 804-05 (1980), the author
recounts the story of
a man injured by gunshot wounds in New York City. While he lay critically
wounded in desperate need of an operation, the hospital dealt with two women,
each claiming to be the patient's wife. One consented to the operation and the
other refused. The hospital was unwilling to proceed with the operation because
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tor for refusing to withdraw a patient from a respirator - on the basis
that "a patient had a right to consent to treatment and.., if consent was
not given, a battery had been committed."'
2 3
The friction caused by the current evolution of the law in this area is
being felt by doctors, patients, and families alike. It is time for the law to
provide the necessary framework within which individual rights of all
parties may be properly protected. A doctor, like any other human be-
ing, has a personal moral, ethical, or religious code of behavior. What
happens if a doctor, because of his or her own personal ethical beliefs, is
unwilling to participate in withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining
procedures? 12 4 Many statutes have made some provision for such a
contingency. 125 The provisions vary significantly. Colorado, for exam-
of the controversy and the lack of unanimous consent. Only after the hospital
filed a petition with the state Supreme Court did the consent become unanimous.
(footnote omitted).
123. N.Y. Times, supra note 122, discussing Estate of Leach v. Shapiro, 13 Ohio App.
3d 393, 469 N.E.2d 1047 (1984).
124. Idaho is one state that evidently has no specific statutory provision on what to do
when a particular doctor refuses to participate. Comment, supra note 106, at 117.
Every few months there are new accounts of court cases involving uncon-
scious patients, which usually arise when a hospital or physician refuses to stop a
life-sustaining therapy that family members feel should be halted. Although no
data have been published on this issue, it is probably unusual for a family and
physician to disagree. The family's wishes about the care of a permanently un-
conscious patient are probably determinative in most situations when the family
has a strong preference. The supportive care that is usually given is probably less
than fully aggressive care: permanently unconscious patients are unlikely to be
admitted to an intensive care unit or to be resuscitated if cardiac arrest occurs.
Most of these patients, however, are probably given such measures as basic hy-
giene and artificial nutrition.
PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, supra note 1, at 186-87 (footnotes omitted).
125. In California, if a patient survives for the required 14 days after notification of
terminal illness, and then properly executes a directive, the directive is by no means bind-
ing on the patient's physician. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7191(b) (West Supp. 1986)
provides that in such circumstances:
No physician, and no licensed health professional acting under the direction of a
physician, shall be criminally or civilly liable forfailing to effectuate the directive
... A failure by a physician to effectuate the directive of a qualified patient
pursuant to this division shall constitute unprofessional conduct if the physician re-
fuses to make the necessary arrangements, or fails to take the necessary steps, to
effect the transfer of the qualified patient to another physician who will effectuate
the directive of the qualified patient.
(Emphasis added). If a California patient had executed a directive, but had not re-
executed it 14 days after being told that he or she was in a terminal condition, then the
directive could be used by the physician only as some evidence of the patient's intent, with
no civil or criminal penalty on the part of the physician, for failing to effectuate the direc-
tive - and not even any mention that such conduct might constitute unprofessional con-
duct. Id. at § 7191(c).
Georgia law provides that:
No person shall be civilly liable for failing or refusing in good faith to effectu-
ate the living will .... The attending physician who fails or refuses to comply
with the declaration ... shall endeavor to advise promptly the next of kin or legal
guardian of the declarant . . . . The attending physician shall thereafter at the
election of the next of kin or the legal guardian of the declarant:
(1) Make a good faith attempt to effect the transfer of the qualified patient
to another physician who will effectuate the declaration of the pa-
tient; or
(2) Permit the next of kin or legal guardian to obtain another physician
who will effectuate the declaration of the patient.
GA. CODE ANN. § 31-32-8(b) (1985) (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
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pie, provides that:
An attending physician who refuses to comply with the terms of
a declaration valid on its face shall transfer the care of the de-
clarant to another physician who is willing to comply with the
declaration. Refusal of an attending physician to comply with
the declaration and failure to transfer the care of the declarant
to another physician shall constitute unprofessinal conduct as
defined in section 12-36-117, C.R.S.
12 6
Colorado thus provides clear instructions for the physician who is faced
with a personal, ethical dilemma and a clear penalty if those instructions
are not followed. Florida law, on the other hand, merely states that:
"An attending physician who refuses to comply with the declaration of a
qualified patient, or the treatment decision of a person designated to
make the decision by the declarant in his declaration or pursuant to sec-
tion 765.07 shall make a reasonable effort to transfer the patient to an-
other physician." 127 A directive, without a penalty provision, may prove
to be of little value in a difficult situation.
Some states, such as Illinois, place the burden on the patient's fam-
ily. The Illinois Living Will Act provides that:
An attending physician who, because of his or her personal
beliefs or conscience, is unable to comply with the declaration
pursuant to this Act shall, without delay, make the necessary
arrangements to effect the transfer of the qualified patient, and
the appropriate medical records that qualify said patient to an-
other physician who has been identified by the qualified patient
or by the family of the qualified patient, for effectuation of the
qualified patient's declaration.
12 8
Placing the burden of "physician shopping" on the family of a terminally
ill patient seems particularly inhumane. Not only will the family already
be under tremendous emotional pressure, 129 but in nearly every case,
the family will also have no idea how to find a doctor who will comply
with the terms of the living will. Additionally, one or more family mem-
bers may not agree with the directives of the living will. One reason
people execute a living will in the first place is to spare their families
from having to make such decisions.
Within the medical profession, it will certainly be known which phy-
sicians are willing to comply with the terms of a living will. Thus, the
Colorado provision, requiring the physician to transfer the patient to a
physician who will comply with the directive, seems by far the best
provision.
126. COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-18-113(5) (Supp. 1985).
127. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 765.09 (West 1986).
128. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 1101/2, 706(c) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1986).
129. See KAREN ANN, supra note 13, for a good description of the emotional pressures
on one family going through the process of attempting to have a family member removed
from a respirator.
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G. What are the Penalties for Forgery, Destruction, or Concealment of a
Living Will or of a Revocation of a Living Will?
Illegal acts involved in execution or revocation of a living will may
result in an unauthorized death.' 3 0 Colorado provides that a person
who forges a declaration is guilty of a class four felony if the forged
declaration is not acted upon. 13' If the forged declaration is acted upon,
resulting in death, the crime is increased to a class two felony. 1 32 Will-
fully concealing or destroying a declaration is a class one misde-
meanor, 133  as is willfully withholding information concerning
revocation of a declaration.1 34 Because concealing the revocation of a
declaration may well lead to unauthorized death, designating such an act
as merely a class one misdemeanor seems entirely unjustified. Although
a family member, in all good faith, may conceal the declaration of an-
other, it is hard to imagine that concealing a revocation could ever be
done in good faith.
H. What is the Effect on Life Insurance and Health Care Insurance When a
Living Will is Signed?
The answer in all states seems to be that there is to be no effect on
either life insurance or health care insurance when a living will is signed.
The Colorado statute is a typical example of such a provision:
The withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining proce-
dures from a qualified patient pursuant to this article shall not,
for any purpose, constitute a suicide or homicide. The exist-
ence of a declaration shall not affect, impair, or modify any con-
tract of life insurance or annuity or be the basis for any delay in
issuing or refusing to issue an annuity or policy of life insur-
ance or any increase of the premium therefor. No insurer or
provider of health care shall require any person to execute a
declaration as a condition of being insured for or receiving
health care services; nor shall the failure to execute a declara-
tion be the basis for any increased or additional premium for a
contract or policy for medical or health insurance.'
35
The Colorado provision is a very well-drafted provision because it pro-
hibits any effect on insurance policies.
130. Although most statutes provide that declarations are applicable only when the
patient is terminally ill, or in a terminal condition, it is nevertheless the intent of the stat-
utes to allow death to come sooner than it would have, when the terms of a declaration are
implemented. When a forged declaration is acted upon, a person who would have chosen
to have life-sustaining procedures continued as long as possible may die sooner than he or
she would have wished. Similarly, if a person in Colorado, for example, executed a decla-
ration at age twenty-five and revoked it at age sixty, any death which resulted from imple-
mentation of the declaration, because the fact of revocation had been concealed, for
example, would constitute an unauthorized death. The doctor, however, is protected un-
less he or she had actual knowledge of the revocation.
131. CoLo. REV. STAT. § 15-18-113(2) (Supp. 1985).
132. Id. at § 15-18-113(3).
133. Id. at § 15-18-113(1).
134. Id. at § 15-18-113(4).
135. Id. at § 15-18-111.
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I. What Rights to Refuse Medical Treatment are Recognized in the
Absence of a Living Will?
In 1914, Justice Cardozo stated that "[e]very human being of adult
years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done with
his own body; and a surgeon who performs an operation without his
patient's consent commits an assault, for which he is liable in dam-
ages."' 13 6 It also has been said that:
Under a free government, at least, the free citizen's first
and greatest right, which underlies all others - the right to the
inviolability of his person.., is the subject of universal acquies-
cence, and this right necessarily forbids a physician or surgeon,
however skillful or eminent.., to violate, without permission,
the bodily integrity of his patient .... 137
Most living will statutes provide that the rights therein contained
are cumulative. Illinois, for example, provides that "[n]othing in this
Act shall impair or supersede any legal right or legal responsibility
which any person may have to effect the withholding or withdrawal of
life-sustaining procedures in any lawful manner. In such respect the
provisions of this Act are cumulative."' 138 Yet, deciding what rights a
patient has to reject treatment, outside the living will statute, may be
most complex. Nearly every state has a law against suicide. It must be
admitted, however, that at times there seems to be a wavering and un-
clear line between suicide and intentional rejection of medical treatment
necessary to sustain life.
In the recent case of Tune v. Walter Reed Army Medical Hospital,139
believed to be the first case decided in federal court on the fight to re-
ject federally provided life-sustaining procedures, the United States Dis-
trict Court for the District of Columbia held that:
[I]t is now a well-established rule of general law, as binding
upon the government as it is upon the medical profession at
large, that it is the patient, not the physician, who ultimately
decides if treatment - any treatment - is to be given ....
But while preservation of life in the abstract is no doubt a
transcendant goal for any society which values human life, the
state's interest in maintaining life must defer to the right to re-
fuse treatment of a competent, emotionally stable, but termi-
nally ill adult whose death is imminent and who is, therefore,
the best, indeed the only, true judge of how such life as remains
to him may best be spent. 140
Despite the policy of the Department of Army, which "preclude[d]
136. Schloendorffv. Society of New York Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125, 129-30, 105 N.E. 92, 93
(1914). For an interesting sample medical treatment declaration, based on contract and
tort theories, see Clarke, supra note 122, at 839-41.
137. Mohr v. Williams, 95 Minn. 516, 104 N.W. 12, 14 (1905) (quoting from Pratt v.
Davis, 37 Chicago Leg. News 213). The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed plaintiff's verdict
in Pratt v. Davis, 224 Ill. 300, 79 N.E. 562 (1906).
138. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 11011,, 709(d) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1986).
139. 602 F. Supp. 1452 (D.D.C. 1985).
140. Id. at 1455-56 (emphasis added).
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the withdrawal of life support systems once placed in operation for a
patient at an Army medical facility,"' 14 1 the court ordered that the sev-
enty-one-year-old widow of an army officer, suffering from terminal can-
cer, be allowed to order that the respirator be removed and that she be
allowed to die. 142 Because the District of Columbia Natural Death Act
was not applicable to a federal facility, 14 3 Mrs. Tune was obliged to as-
sert her rights outside the context of any living will statute, and those
rights were recognized on the basis of "general law."' 144
Since the United States Attorney in the Tune case waived, prior to
trial, any right of the defendant to appeal,14 5 there has been no appeal.
The District Court opinion remains a strong, contemporary statement of
a "general law" holding that even in the absence of a living will, a com-
petent, terminally ill patient has the right to demand that life-sustaining
procedures be withdrawn.
On January 17, 1985, the NewJersey Supreme Court revised part of
the holding it made nine years earlier in Quinlan. The court held that,
although New Jersey had no Natural Death act, any evidence of state-
ments made by a patient, prior to losing mental capacity, should be
treated as significant evidence in determining whether or not withdrawal
of life-sustaining procedures - including nutrition - should be permit-
ted for a permanently incompetent, unconscious patient "with no possi-
bility of returning to any sort of cognitive function."' 14 6
Thus, in the absence of any living will, any other written declara-
tion, and any specific statutory authorization, both New Jersey 14 7 and
the United States District Court for the District of Columbia 14 8 have fol-
141. Id. at 1453.
142. Id. at 1456.
143. Id. at 1453 n.2.
144. Id. at 1455. The use of the term "general law" may be important. Does this mean
that the court considers its opinion part of the "general federal common law" which has
been appearing recently, mainly in environmental cases such as Illinois v. Milwaukee, 406
U.S. 91 (1972), despite the oft-repeated statements of Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S.
64 (1938)?
145. 602 F. Supp. at 1454.
146. In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 486 A.2d, 1209, 1230 (1985).
147. In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (1976); In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 486
A.2d 1209 (1985).
148. Tune v. Walter Reed Army Medical Hosp., 602 F. Supp. 1452 (D.D.C. 1985). See
also Superintendent of Belchertown v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417 (Mass. 1977), one of the
earliest and most important cases in the field. In Saikewicz, the court was asked to decide
whether medical treatment should be ordered for Joseph Saikewicz, a 67-year-old man
who was retarded, and had a mental age of approximately three years. He could not talk
or answer questions intelligibly, and had been living in state institutions since he was
about 12 years old, and the Belchertown State School since about age 17. On April 19,
1976, Saikewicz was diagnosed as having leukemia, for which chemotherapy would be the
usual treatment and the treatment which the majority of competent patients would choose.
Because of Saikewicz's age, there would be a 30-40 percent chance that chemotherapy
would cause remission for 2 to 13 months, but would not cure the leukemia. The evidence
was that Saikewicz would not understand the treatment, which would be painful, and that
he would have to be physically restrained for extended periods of time - 12 to 24 hours
per day for up to five days. Without treatment, Saikewicz would probably die a relatively
painless death within a matter of weeks or months. The SupremeJudicial Court of Massa-
chusetts, in ruling that Saikewicz need not be subjected to chemotherapy, stated, "[wie take
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lowed and then expanded upon earlier cases that had permitted life-
sustaining procedures to be withheld or withdraw from a mentally in-
competent patient. Now oral statements may also be considered signifi-
cant in determining the treatment to be given a patient.
Clearly, the law is simultaneously developing in roughly the same
direction through both the legislative and judicial processes. Once
again the law is gradually evolving to recognize those rights that have
previously been claimed by the people. ' 4 9 Even in the absence of a liv-
ing will, people are increasingly being allowed to decline life-sustaining
procedures - either directly, if competent, or by a guardian, if
incompetent.
III. OTHER EXISTING LEGISLATION IN COLORADO WHICH MAY BE USED
TO INSURE A RIGHT TO DETERMINE WHEN MEDICAL
TREATMENT SHALL CEASE
As stated in the Colorado Act, "Colorado law has traditionally rec-
ognized the right of a competent adult to accept or reject medical or
surgical treatment affecting his person."' 150 So while a person remains
competent, he or she should be able to reject medical treatment without
further statutory authorization. While competent, a person may execute
a living will to take care of some of the situations which may arise if the
person becomes incompetent. As indicated above, 15 1 there are a
number of situations in which a living will executed in compliance with
the Colorado statute simply will not be applicable. It is with those situa-
tions that we will now be primarily concerned.
A Colorado living will would not be applicable in a situation such as
Karen Ann Quinlan's where a person has reached a "persistent vegeta-
tive state," but may "live" for several years and is thus not in a terminal
condition. The Act would also not apply when a person is conscious,
but mentally incompetent. Such a person would not be allowed to exe-
cute a living will because of the statutory requirement of competence.
That person might not be able to communicate, to eat, to move, or to
breathe alone, and might be in extreme pain with no hope of recovery,
but still not be terminally ill. In such a case, the Colorado living will act
would not apply because of the requirement that the person be in a ter-
minal condition. The person may be expected to live for several years,
attached to a machine, unable to communicate, in extreme pain, but the
living will act would provide no assistance.
the view that the substantive rights of the competent and the incompetent person are the
same in regard to the right to decline potentially life-prolonging treatment." Id. at 423.
149. "The law always lags behind the most advanced thinking in every area. It must
wait until the theologians and the moral leaders and events have created some common
ground, some consensus." Burger, The Law and Medical Advances, 67 ANNALS INTERNAL
MED. Supp. 7, 15, 17 (1967), quoted in Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d at 423. See also the history of
western water law, in which the doctrine of prior appropriation was first established by the
miners, and then recognized by the courts. R. POWELL & P. ROHAN, POWELL ON REAL
PROPERTY § 734 (1968).
150. COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-18-102(l)(a) (SUpp. 1985).
151. See supra notes 55-84 and accompanying text.
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If not terminally ill, a conscious, mentally incompetent person or a
person in a "persistent vegetative state," could only refuse further medi-
cal treatment through the intervention of a third party - usually called
an agent. A legal agent is created when a competent person grants to
another person a power of attorney, authorizing the agent to have the
power and authority to act on behalf of the principal in certain mat-
ters. 152 The principal is the person who establishes the agency relation-
ship by delegating certain of the principal's own powers to the agent.
The agent owes a fiduciary duty to the principal and must exercise his or
her authority in the principal's best interest.
At common law, the power of the agent ceased upon the death or
incapacity of the principal.' 5 3 In recent years, however, Colorado has
adopted legislation recognizing what is referred to as a "durable power
of attorney."' 154 A durable power may be drafted either to remain effec-
tive after the incapacity of the principal or to become effective when the
principal loses mental capacity. 15 5 Durable powers offer great promise
for persons who would choose to refuse further medical treatment if
they were in a "persistent vegetative state," or hopelessly ill, in great
pain and mentally incompetent.
Although the Colorado durable power of attorney statute does not
specifically mention the withholding or withdrawal of medical treatment,
several courts have held that an incompetent person must have the same
right to refuse medical treatment as is enjoyed by a competent per-
son. 156 Thus, if a competent person would be allowed to refuse life-
sustaining medical treatment, then an incompetent person, acting
through a previously instructed agent, must have the same right to re-
fuse treatment. Thus, it seems wise for a person who would like to have
medical treatment rejected in some circumstances to put directives to
that effect in a durable power of attorney.
To insure compliance with his or her wishes, the principal should be
able to select the person, or succession of persons, authorized to act as
his or her agent under the durable power of attorney. The principal
should be permitted to be just as specific, or as general, as he or she
wishes with regard to the circumstances under which the agent is di-
rected to exercise the principal's right to refuse life-sustaining medical
treatment. 15 7 A durable power of attorney may be drafted to include
power only over specific medical decisions and need not include power
over any financial affairs of the principal.
If the principal plans to use the durable power of attorney to allow
the principal to exercise his or her right to refuse medical treatment,
through the agent, then the power should also include two other provi-
152. See BALLENTINE'S LAw DICTIONARY 50 (3rd ed. 1969).
153. A. Scorr, ABRIDGEMENT OF THE LAW OF TRUSTS, § 8 (1960).
154. CoLo. REV. STAT. § 15-14-501 (Supp. 1985).
155. Id.
156. See supra notes 11-14 and accompanying text, and supra note 148.
157. See supra notes 28-38 and accompanying text, for arguments for and against speci-
ficity with regard to future medical treatment.
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sions. The agent should be given the authority to hire and fire doctors
for the principal - to insure that the agent will be able to find a doctor
who will comply with the principal's directives. 158 The agent should
also be given authority to have the principal moved, under specified cir-
cumstances, to Colorado, or to some other jurisdiction with similar laws,
in case the principal becomes permanently comatose, for example, while
in another state.
159
Unfortunately, execution of a well-drafted durable power will not
guarantee that the principal's directives about medical treatment will be
honored in Colorado. Colorado law provides that a conservator, ap-
pointed to manage the assets of an incompetent person, 160 "has the
same power the principal would have had if he were not disabled or
incompetent, to revoke, suspend, or terminate all or any part of the
power of attorney or agency."' 16 1 A competent adult may nominate in
writing who his or her conservator should be if the need for a conserva-
tor should later arise. 162 A court is required only to give "considera-
tion" to appointment of the person nominated as conservator. The
court is not bound to accept as conservator the nominated person.'
63
Under current Colorado law, a conservator can revoke the best-drafted
durable power of attorney.
In summary, the Colorado legislative authorization for a durable
power of attorney provides a valuable tool for allowing a person to exer-
cise his or her right to refuse medical treatment even after he or she has
become incompetent. But the tool is not perfect and further legislation
is needed to clarify and expand its legal effect.
IV. PROPOSALS FOR FUTURE LEGISLATION IN COLORADO
To provide a truly comprehensive Medical Treatment Decision Act,
Colorado should amend its current statute and remedy the identified
shortcomings. The proposed changes are presented in their order of
importance.
In order for section 15-14-501 to better embody the legislature's
158. It has been suggested, for example, that the Quinlan case would never have arisen
if the Quinlans had simply switched doctors. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, supra note 1 at 194
n.56, quoting from Bai, Around the Quinlan Case - Interview with Judge R. Muir, 1 INT'L J.
MED. 45, 55 (1979). This suggestion is supported by the following data:
a survey of 30 physicians in Napa, California, in October, 1979 ... found that 18
of the 20 physicians who responded would discontinue the respirator on a patient
with permanent vegetative state if the next-of-kin agrees. If the permanently un-
conscious patient can breathe without artificial support, 23 of 29 physicians
would stop antibiotics for pneumonia on parental request and 14 of 28 would
stop nasogastric tube feedings.
PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, supra note 1, at 187 n.41, referring to D. MEYERS, MEDICO-
LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF DEATH AND DYING, 167-68 (1981).
159. For further discussion of this point, see Marsh, Working With the New Medical Treat-
ment Decision (Living Will) Act, 15 COLO. LAW. 645. 646 (1986).
160. COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-14-401(3) (1973).
161. Id. at § 15-14-501 (1973) (as amended 1977).
162. Id. at § 15-14-410(l)(b) (1973).
163. Id. at § 15-14-410(1).
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intent in authorizing durable powers of attorney, the statute should be
amended in two ways. It should specifically authorize that a durable
power may be drafted to cover medical treatment decisions, and it
should specifically provide that a conservator does not have the power to
revoke any part of a durable power pertaining to medical treatment deci-
sions. If it is true that "Colorado law has traditionally recognized the
right of a competent adult to accept or reject medical or surgical treat-
ment affecting his person," 164 then that right should continue to be ex-
ercisable by the person, through an agent, even when the person is
unable to assert his own rights. A person should not be denied the right
to control what happens to his or her own body just because the person
has become unconscious or incompetent.
165
The legislature should amend section 106 of the Medical Treatment
Decision Act' 6 6 to specify whether a spouse can be a witness and
whether the person who signs on behalf of declarant can also be a wit-
ness. Provisions should be made in sections 103, 104, and 107 for effec-
tuating a declaration when a person is in a "persistent vegetative state,"
even though not in a terminal condition.
16 7
The legislature should also determine what time shall be considered
to be the moment of death when a person dies as a result of withdrawal
of life-sustaining procedures. Many wills disposing of property provide
that the property shall go to a certain person if he survives the testator
or if he survives the life tenant. If the actual moment of death can be
determined by when the respirator is unplugged, then the order the res-
pirators of a testator and a beneficiary, for example, are unplugged, af-
ter both are injured in a common disaster, would make a tremendous
financial difference to the various parties. The financial interests of
third parties should not be allowed to control when a respirator is
unplugged.
When a terminal condition is caused by a particular injury or event,
it would be wise to provide that the date of death for a person from
whom life-sustaining procedures are withdrawn or who would have been
eligible to have life-sustaining procedures withdrawn, shall relate back
to the moment of the injury or event. 168 Then, only the welfare of the
patient would be a factor in determining whether or not to remove a
patient from a respirator. That resolution would solve a situation like
164. d. at § 15-18-102(1)(a) (Supp. 1985).
165. See supra notes 11-14 and accompanying text, and supra note 148.
166. COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 15-18-101 to -113.
167. A current situation in Grand Junction, Colorado, demonstrates the need for
change in the Colorado Medical Treatment Decision Act. Hector Rodas is a Guatemalan
immigrant. A drug overdose has left him completely paralyzed with permanent brain stem
damage. He has no health insurance and his visa has expired. He has not wavered in his
request for death over permanent incapacitation. Denver Post, Sept. 17, 1986, at B4, col.
1. On December 16, 1986, the Mesa County District Court, Judge Buss presiding, heard
the petition to appoint a guardian for him. The hearing involved two issues. Can he
choose death, even though not in a terminal condition? Is he mentally competent to make
the decision? Mesa County District Court, docket 86-PR 139.
168. See Marsh, supra note 159, at 645.
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Karen Ann Quinlan's where her incapacity was evidently caused by a
certain, though unknown,' 6 9 event on a specific day.
In the case of a terminal illness not caused by a specific injury or
event, however, it is much more difficult to determine what should be
considered the moment of death. If the patient becomes unconscious
before the respirator is removed, that occurrence would seem to be an
appropriate time to designate as the moment of death. The moment at
which a patient becomes unconscious is possibly not subject to quite as
much manipulation as when a patient is removed from a respirator. But
pain killers might cause a patient to become unconscious, and pain kill-
ers should certainly not be withheld or administered because of the fi-
nancial interests of the relatives. It may be best to attempt to deal
legislatively with only terminal conditions resulting from a particular in-
jury or event. In reality, it may be only in cases of common disaster that
there is any real likelihood of having several members of a family on
respirators at the same time.
One final proposal for legislation will be made, although it is recog-
nized to be extremely controversial. In studying the cases in which it
was determined that it would be legally appropriate to withdraw life-
sustaining procedures, it became apparent that natural death, or "death
with dignity," may in fact be a very painful process for the patient.170
Medical experts simply disagree as to the amount, and kind, of pain felt
by unconscious patients.' 7 ' Drugs can be used quite effectively to mask
pain. But they may not do so completely.
Setting aside for a moment the dictates of history, 17 2 exactly what is
169. In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647, 653 (1976).
170. Karen Ann Quinlan, for example, though medically diagnosed as being in a per-
sistent vegetative and "moribund" state, appeared to be feeling great pain. Phyllis Battelle,
the only journalist ever permitted to see Karen Ann, stated:
Karen's head was in constant movement, straining back and forth in an erratic,
swiveling motion - as though seeking relief from her rigid body. The eyes, still
intensely blue, roved wildly, never quite focusing, and her mouth closed and
opened in a series of grimaces that gave the impression she was soundlessly cry-
ing out in anguish .... She was attached to a series of machines and hanging
bottles by a variety of tubes: two thin ones inserted into her nostrils fed her;
another delivered antibiotics directly into her kidneys; a transparent, hoselike
tube was attached to her upper chest, sputtering and gurgling as it pumped air
from a respirator into Karen's lungs. Occasionally, she would emit a low, moan-
ing sound.
KAREN ANN, supra note 13, at 341-42.
171. In In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 486 A.2d 1209, 1217 (1985), the court stated:
Both doctors testified that if the nasogastric tube were removed, Ms. Conroy
would die of dehydration in about a week. Dr. Davidoff believed that the result-
ing thirst could be painful but that Ms. Conroy would become unconscious long
before she died. Dr. Kazemi concurred that such a death would be painful.
Yet the court cited Saunders, "Current Views on Pain Relief and Terminal Care" in THE
THERAPY OF PAIN 215 (Swerdlow ed. 1981), to the effect that "a hospice reports complete
control of pain in over 99% of its dying patients." Id. at 1247.
172. According to one commentator:
On January 23, 1906, a euthanasia bill was introduced in the Ohio legisla-
ture. The bill provided that an individual suffering from excessive pain with no
hope of recovery, who stated before three witnesses that he wanted to die, would
be treated in a manner to help end the suffering and hasten death. The bill was
soundly defeated by [23 to 79] ....
A euthanasia bill ... was brought before the British Parliament in 1936. The
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accomplished by letting a patient from whom life-sustaining procedures
have been appropriately removed die a "natural" death? The "natural"
death permitted to a person who has been removed from a respirator is
a death caused by an inability to gasp enough air. The "natural" death
permitted to a person from whom artificial nourishment processes have
been withdrawn is death by starvation. Must society demand that a ter-
minally ill person, in great pain, be allowed to end the dying process
only by directing that the person be starved to death?
When a horse, or a dog, or a cat is so seriously injured that it has no
chance of survival, nearly every civilized person believes that the injured
horse, or dog, or cat should be "put to sleep" as promptly and painlessly
as possible. Society would not permit the owner of a terminally injured
horse to allow the horse to bleed to death, starve to death, or die of
untreated further complications such as infections.17 3 Why, then, is it
necessary for the law to refuse so adamantly to allow a competent adult
to direct that when he or she is in a hopeless, terminal condition, he or
she is simply to be "put to sleep" by medication as promptly and pain-
lessly as possible?
V. CONCLUSION
The law is in the process of evolving in order to determine appro-
priate responses to recent advances in medical technology. Both case
law and legislation have increasingly recognized situations in which a
person, or his or her agent, should be allowed to decline life-sustaining
procedures in favor of a natural death, a death with dignity. As medical
technology improves, the way in which the law continues to evolve will
be extremely important.
The law must provide a means by which a person in a painful, hope-
less situation like that suffered by Abe Perlmutter may be permitted to
direct that he or she shall be allowed to die with dignity. The law must
permit a person to direct that if he or she shall someday be determined
to be in a "permanent vegetative state" like that of Karen Ann Quinlan,
medical treatment shall cease. Families must not be subjected to the
emotional and financial burdens imposed by the type of litigation the
Quinlan family was required to pursue. And some means must be found
for a terminally ill father to be released from unbearable pain without
causing his son to be sentenced to jail for life. As law has evolved
throughout history to meet the needs of societal developments, so must
it continue to evolve today.
bill, which did not pass, included many elements of today's living wills: an adult
eligibility requirement, an incurable illness, and a form signed before two wit-
nesses. (footnotes omitted)
Comment, Natural Death Legislation in lllinois - The Illinois Living Will Act. Ill. Rev. Slat. Ch.
110, 701 to 710 (1983), 1984 S. ILL. UNiv. L.J. 465, 467.
173. See supra notes 5, 60, 95, and 171.
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